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Financialisation of the transnational food chain: from threat to leverage point? 
Dr. Tomaso Ferrando, Bristol University Law School 
Abstract 
The 2008-2009 spike in food prices brought to the forefront the link between the transnational food system 
and the mechanisms of finance. However, the connections between the food system and financial capital 
go far beyond trading in futures and food-related indexes: financial capital is increasingly affecting access 
and ownership of land, supporting monoculture and long-distance trade, supporting the production of 
animal proteins and redefining the way in which transformation, distribution, and consumption take place. 
In response to this process, two categories of approaches are identified that differ in terms of objective and 
processes: that of those who prefer engaging from within the financial paradigm and that of those who call 
for more stringent regulations. This contribution uses a series of examples to reflect on the potential and 
limits demonstrated by different legal and quasi-legal to the financialisation of the food system and suggest 
that complexity and interconnections may become allies in making the food system more sustainable. 
Among these, the potential behind the EU Directive 95/2015 on non-financial disclosure is analysed with 
particular care. 
 
Introduction  
The 2008-2009 commodity bubble, the food shortages and the riots that ensued in several countries around 
the world brought to the forefront the link between the transnational food system and the mechanisms of 
finance: the impact that speculation can have on the availability of food became visible.1 However, the 
connection between the food system and financial capital is deeper than trading in futures and food-related 
indexes: global finance has stretched to the roots and fundamentals of the food chain and is penetrating its 
daily practices. In the last decade, news from the financial world and academic studies suggest that private 
                                                             
1 Jennifer Clapp, ‘Financialization, Distance and Global Food Politics’ (2014) 41(5) Journal of Peasant Studies 797; 
SOMO, Building a coalition against food speculation, (2011), online: <https://www.somo.nl/building-a-coalition-
against-food-speculation>; Oliver De Schutter, 'Observations on the current food price situation', Background note, 
(January, 2011); Oliver De Schutter, 'Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises: Regulation to reduce the 
risks of price volatility', United Nations, Briefing Note 02, 2011; Luigi Russi, Hungry Capital: The Financialization 
of Food (Zero Book, 2011); Steve Wiggins and Sharada Keats, Grain Stocking and Price Spikes (Overseas 
Development Institute, 2011); David Burch and Geoffrey Lawrence, “Towards a Third Food Regime: Behind the 
Transformation” (2009) 26(4) Agricultural and Human Values 267.  
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equity funds, pension funds, insurance groups and commercial banks have targeted the agri-food system as 
a safe harbour in which to allocate their shareholders' money and extract high returns.2 Through equity, 
debt or other legal tools, financiers have been increasing their role in defining what is produced, eaten, 
distributed and consumed. The consequences of such a massive flow of money that is invested in the food 
system in order to reward pensioners, billionaires and rent-seekers shareholders (in the order of tens of 
billions of dollars per year) cannot be ignored.  
The fact that the food system has been financialised should not come as a surprise. Rather than an 
exception, the link between Wall Street and food is the manifestation of a process of transformation and 
expansion of capitalism that has been discussed by several authors adopting different perspectives and 
looking at other sectors of the economy.3 Although not unexpected, the redefinition of the agri-food system 
to satisfy the aspirations and objectives of financial actors raises specific questions and poses ad hoc 
challenges. In a world were almost two billion people are food insecure (not having access to enough 
adequate food or eating too much and of poor quality),4 a third of the food for human consumption is thrown 
away,5 36 percent of global crops are fed to livestock,6 food systems in 2012 contributed 19–29 percent of 
global anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,7 and financial investors hold around 80 percent of 
all the shares available on stock markets, 8 we must take the presence and actions of finance seriously. 
                                                             
2 See, e.g., BlackRock, BlackRock World Agricultural Fund’ (2018), online:< 
https://www.blackrock.com/hk/en/products/229904/blackrock-world-agriculture-fund-a2-usd>; Ecofin Agency, 
‘Phatisa Food Fund 2 first closes at us$ 121.5 million’ (Ecofin Agency, 3 October 2018), online: < 
https://www.ecofinagency.com/finance/0310-39030-phatisa-food-fund-2-first-closes-at-us-121-5-million>  
and Tatiana Freitas , ‘Harvard Blew $1 Billion in Bet on Tomatoes, Sugar, and Eucalyptus’ (Bloomberg, 1 March 
2018), online: < https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-01/harvard-blew-1-billion-in-bet-on-tomatoes-
sugar-and-eucalyptus>. Among the academic publications that have reflected on the link beterrn food and finance, 
see, e.g. Jennifer Clapp and Ryan Isakson. Speculative Harvest. Financialization, Food and Agriculture (Fernwood 
Publishing, 2018); Jennifer Clapp and Ryan Isakson, ‘Risky Returns: The Implications of Financialization in the Food 
System’ (2018) 49(2) Development and Change 437.  
3 Gerald Epstein, Financialization and the World Economy (Edward Elgar, 2005); Ben Fine, ‘Financialization from a 
Marxist perspective’ (2014) 42(4) International Journal of Political Economy 47; Philip Arestis, Aurélie Charles and 
Giuseppe Fontana. ‘Financialization, the Great Recession and the stratification of the US labor market’ (2013) 19(3) 
Feminist Economics, 152-180. 
4 Food and Agriculture Organization, The State of Food Security and Nutrition (Food and Agriculture Organization, 
2018). 
5 Nicola Lucifero, ‘Food Loss and Waste in the EU Law between Sustainability of Well-Being and the Implications 
on Food System and on Environment’ (2016) 8 Agriculture and Agricultural Science Procedia 282; Tomaso Ferrando 
and Julie Mansuy, ‘European Action Against Food Loss and Waste: Co-Regulation and Collisions on the Way to the 
Sustainable Development Goals’ (2018) 15 Yearbook of European Law 1; 
6 Emily S. Cassidy, Paul C. West, James S. Gerber and Jonathan A. Foley, ‘Redefining agricultural yields: from 
tonnes to people nourished per hectare’ (2013) Environmental Research Letters 1. 
7 Sonja J. Vermeulen, Bruce M. Campbell and John S.I. Ingram, ‘Climate Change and Food Systems’ (2012) 37 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 195 
8 Charles McGrath, 80% of equity market cap held by institutions (Pensions & Investments, 25 April 2017), online: 
<https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-
institutions> 
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Decisions made by few key financial players are increasingly transforming land into a financial asset and 
making it hard for small-scale farmers to stay on the land, supporting the expansion of large scale 
conventional monoculture, relying on the consolidation of long distance trading, providing liquidity to 
livestock producers to satisfy the protein demand of emerging countries and ‘covering with gold’ companies 
that patent and sell genetically modified seeds because of the desire for higher yields.9 In one sentence, 
finance is actively engaged in globalising a transnational food chain that produces high economic return 
independently from people’s needs and the ecological limits of the planet.  
This transition has not gone unnoticed and different approaches have been adopted both within and 
without social movements. Yet, reactions and engagement may be limited by the complexity of the matter, 
the lack of clarity and the intensification of the imbalance of power between those who profit from the 
system and those who suffer from its externalities.10  On the one hand, there is the conflictual position, that 
the increasing financialisation of the food chain and the distance between decision making and conducts 
produce a multiplicity of negative effects and hinder resistance.11 Even when institutional investors and 
large financial players are involved, responsible forms of ownership and good governance would not be 
transformative,12 because of the obsession with shareholders’ value and because of the way in which growth 
has to be constantly achieved. Geographically separated from the low paid producer workforce, the starving 
populations and the unbreathable air contaminated by pesticides, financial investors are only looking at 
quarterly performances, so that financial report and profitability become the sole possible language of 
communication between principals and agents.13  
                                                             
9 Madeleine Fairbarn, ‘‘Like Gold with Yield’: Evolving Intersections between Farmland and Finance’ (2014) 5(41) 
Journal of Peasant Studies 777. 
10 Jennifer Clapp and Ryan Isakson (n 2).  
11 Jennifer Clapp (n 1) 797; Anna Chadwick. Law and the Political Economy of Hunger (Oxford University Press, 
2019); Russi (n 1). On distancing and the food system, see, e.g. Harriet Friedmann, ‘Distance and Durability: the 
Shaky Foundation of the World Food System’ (1992) 13(2) The World Quarterly 371. On distancing and the limits of 
enforcing responsibility in the global economy, see, e.g., Thomas Princen, ‘The shading and distancing of commerce: 
When internalization is not enough’ (1997) 20(3) Ecological Economics 235. On resistance against financialization, 
see, e.g., Andrea M. Collins, ‘Financialization, Resistance and the Question of Women’s Land Rights’ (2018) 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 1; Per Forsberg, Anna-Karin Stockenstrand, ‘Resistance to Financialization: 
Insights About Collective Resistance Through Distancing and Persistence from Two Ethnographic Studies’ (2014) 
3(2) Journal of Organizational Ethnography 169. 
12 Lorraine Talbot, ‘Why Shareholders Shouldn’t Vote: A Marxist-progressive Critique of Shareholder 
Empowerment’ (2013) 76(5) The Modern Law Review 791; Charlotte Villiers, ‘Has the financial crisis revealed that 
responsible ownership is a myth?’, in Ian MacNeil and Justin O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Hart, 
2010).  
13 Eugene Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288; Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416. 
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A more optimistic position characterises the ideas of stewardship and sustainable finance, whose 
proponents believe that an efficient system of accounting and transparency, coupled with the internalisation 
of the environmental and social impact of economic activities, provides an opportunity to improve the 
economy and reduce externalities.14 Although finance is seen as distant and removed from the real life of 
the agri-food system, any change in their conduct would generate a positive domino effect that would reach 
the four corners of the planet because of the intangible connections that equity, debt and derivatives create 
between financial hubs and the territoriality of every investment that they realised. When the financial 
sector intervenes in the production, transformation and distribution of food, it could be said that their 
investments may operate as ‘legal chokeholds’,15 i.e. leverage points for legal interventions aimed at 
challenging misconducts across the food chains and increasing liability.16  
In the context of opposing paradigms, this contribution reflects on the potential and limits of 
leveraging finance as a ‘legal chokehold’ to improve the social and environmental quality of the global food 
system. After an introduction on the financialisation of food and the notion of chokeholds, this paper uses 
concrete examples to discuss the potential and limits of organising around ‘leverage points’ that are both 
external (mandatory rules, limits to commodity trading, etc.) and internal (Principle for Responsible 
Investments, shareholder activism, etc.) to the financial sector. Halfway between external and internal, the 
European Union (EU) Directive 95/2014 on non-financial reporting is discussed in Section III as a mixed 
mechanism of engagement with finance, a European meta-regulation that may help mapping, exposing and 
(possibly) challenging the actions of those who really benefit from the financialisation of the transnational 
food regime. Yet, the conclusions reflect on the inherent limits of a strategy that engages with finance 
without addressing the systemic and inherent problems that arise when the food chain is structured around 
the premises and objectives of finance. 
 
                                                             
14 Frank Curtis, Ida Levine and James Browning, ‘The Institutional Investor’s role in ‘responsible ownership’’, in Ian 
MacNeil and Justin O’Brien (eds) The Future of Financial Regulation (Hart, 2010); David Monciardini, ‘The 
‘Coalition of the Unlikely’ Driving the EU Regulatory Process of Non-Financial Reporting’ (2016) 36(1) Social and 
Environmental Accountability Journal 76. 
15 Tomaso Ferrando, ‘Land Rights at the time of Global Production: Leveraging Multi-Spatiality and ‘Legal 
Chokeholds’’ (2017) 2(2) Business and Human Rights Journal 275. 
16 Deborah Cowen, The Deadly Life of Logistics (University of Minnesota Press, 2014); David Harvey, The Enigma 
of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism (Profile Books, 2010). 
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I. Financialisation of the transnational food chain: speculation, indexes and more 
Financialisation has been described as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies.”17 
This mainly assumes the form of dividends, interests on debt or remuneration of financial instruments like 
derivatives and indexes. The macro and micro components of our socio-economic system are thus 
increasingly defined by the pressure that financial actors exercise to generate returns on an increasing 
amount of investments. Decisions made in a few offices by men in suits are redefining the economic system 
and, at the same time, redesigning individual lives. Let’s take two examples: as we are all aware, the 2008 
global financial meltdown was deeply determined by the combination of collateralisation, securitisation 
and the creation of money through debt (itself a financial product). At the other extreme of the spectrum, 
the pensions of millions of workers all over the world depends on the financial strategy of investors who 
are entrusted with their savings and whose job is to invest workers’ savings today so to guarantee their 
pensions in the future. Through finance, global and local intensify their interconnection.  
From the point of view of the food system, the first evidence of financialisation reaching the broader 
public was with the 2008-2010 food crisis, when a combination of derivatives, grain stocking and climate 
events led to price spikes, hunger and riots.18 However, financial capital is increasingly involved in the 
definition of what food is produced, where, how and for whom. It is transforming food production and 
consumption according to investors’ desire for a stable return on their investment rather than by the wider 
needs of people and ecological limits. 19  According to Burch and Lawrence, in 2009 the food regime was 
already heading towards a situation where: 
a number of financial institutions and instruments that have the capacity to re-organise various 
stages of the agri-food supply chain, and to alter the terms and conditions under which other actors 
in the chain can operate. In the case of the private equity company, for example, we see a fraction 
of capital which views the agri-food company—whether it is a third-party auditor, an input supplier, 
a farm operator, a food manufacturer or a retailer—as a bundle of resources which provide 
opportunities for a quick profit, which may or may not involve a restructuring, but which will 
                                                             
17 Gerald Epstein (n 3) 3.  
18 Russi (n 1); Steve Wiggins and Sharad Keats, Grain Stocking and Price Spikes (Overseas Development Institute, 
2011). 
19 David Burch and Geoffrey Lawrence (n 1) 267; Philip McMichael, ‘A Food Regime Genealogy’ (2009) 36(1) The 
Journal of Peasant Studies 139; Harriet Friedmann, ‘Commentary: Food Regime analysis and Agrarian Questions: 
Widening the Conversation’ (2016) 43(3) The Journal of Peasant Studies 671; Jennifer Clapp and Ryan Isakson, 
Speculative Harvest. Financialization, Food and Agriculture (Fernwood Publishing, 2018).  
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eventually return the enterprise to the share market and then move on to another bundle of 
resources.20 
That transnational food production is on the radar of financial investors is not a mystery. Financial 
advisors, pension funds managers and brokers from the four corners of the planet are open and transparent 
in highlighting the economic potential of investing in food. This is often justified by the food needs of a 
growing population, the shift in diets towards a Western model of consumption, the scarcity of resources, 
the possibility to extract resources controlling logistics, and the possibility of return represented by 
controlling one of the essential elements of life. Not investing in food would be a loss opportunity.21 A 
narrative that is shared with multi-lateral agricultural projects like the G8 New Alliance on Food and 
Nutrition Security and the Agenda 2030, in particular of Sustainable Development Goal 2 on Zero Hunger 
and Goal 17 on Partnership for the Goals.22 
Throughout the world, financial capital is distributed along the food chain so that corporations are 
acquired, merged, invested and reorganised according to principles of effectiveness, efficiency and financial 
return. Although more liquidity may lead to a strengthening of the sector, what is happening is a radical 
transformation. We only need to spend six minutes watching a short video telling the story of Richard David 
and Desmond Cheung, co-managers of the BlackRock Global Fund—World Agricultural Fund, to have a 
sense of the scale of the issue already back in 2011.23 In the video, the two financers share their experience 
on the ground, meeting with corporations and people working for them, with the aim to convince the viewer 
(a possible investors in the Fund) that investing in land, traders, seeds companies and retailers is safe and 
profitable. Not only they are sharing their consideration on the current food system, but they are making 
projections about the future of food and what the food system is that they envisage, i.e. they believe that 
money could be generated in the future.  
The financialisation of the food system means, therefore, to allocate resources according to Richard 
and Desmond’s vision (or any other financer’s vision), to invest them where analysts believe the highest 
                                                             
20 David Burch and Geoffrey Lawrence (n 1) 275. 
21 Lutz Goedde, Maya Horii, and Sunil Sanghvi, ‘Pursuing the global opportunity in food and agribusiness’ (McKinsey 
& Company, July 2015) < https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/chemicals/our-insights/pursuing-the-global-
opportunity-in-food-and-agribusiness> accessed 17 December 2018; Financial Tribune, ‘Advantages of Investment 
in Food Industry’ (Financial Tribune, 18 March 2015) <https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-
economy/13557/advantages-of-investment-in-food-industry> accessed 17 December 2018; Caroline Bergdolt and 
Anuradha Mittal, ‘Betting on World Agriculture: US Private Equity Managers Eye Agricultural Returns’ (2012) The 
Oakland Institute.  
22 United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN Publishing, 2015). 
23 BlackRock, BlackRock Global Fund – World Agricultural Fund (2011), 
online:<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AMYPPalcoac>.  
 
7 
 
profits can be generated. From farm to fork, the food chain is witnessing acquisitions, mergers, vertical and 
horizontal concentration, investments in commodity indexes, purchases of lands, an increasing use of debt 
as a mechanism to support agricultural activities and an intense competition for futures and other financial 
instruments that can reduce the risk over the investment. Two financial actors (Vanguard and BlackRock) 
were the main investors in four seeds and chemical companies that recently gave birth to two of the three 
largest mergers in the sectors of seeds and agricultural inputs (Monsanto and Bayern, Dupont and 
DowChemical). Similar scenarios characterise global supermarket chains, logistic companies, farmland, 
food processors and retailers.  
Decisions made in a few hubs by a few investors are creating networks and threads that connect 
geographies and people through common investors that see in that business a potential for financial return. 
BlackRock, for example, keeps together farmers, trades and consumers across different sectors and different 
parts of the world, and in December 2018 the Norwegian Pension Fund had investments in more than 9,000 
companies in 72 countries. A sense of the widespread nature of finance and the ‘hub’ role of few actors is 
evident.24 Financial connections and financialisation go beyond the material interactions of the transnational 
food chains and are obliquely operating across commodities and sectors. If finance is the main driver behind 
the transformation of the global food system, it is increasingly the target of dissent and resistance. 
Throughout the world, the desire to react against the implications and consequences of 
financialisation has favoured the emergence of a series of local and global reactions: sometimes they 
overlap but they seldom coordinate. As discussed in the next sections, some interventions try to subordinate 
finance to the superior authority of the state and bring the state-market relationship closer to the former,25 
while others operate within a context of coexistence between the localism of the environmental and human 
rights violations (material or potential) and the global expansion of financial capital that cuts across borders 
and reaches multiple geographies. For the supporters of the latter approach, the idea is that in the context 
where financial players own the equity or debt of thousands of companies around the world, it is more 
effective to challenge the source of funding rather than engaging with the companies operating on the 
ground. Like a revised version of the trickle-down economy, the expectation is that a change at the top of 
the financial pyramid may trickle down to the ground. This difference of approach between opposition and 
coordination is what I define as the ‘without or within’, which I discuss in the next Section. 
                                                             
24 Norges Bank Investment Management, ‘Government Pension Fund Global – The Fund’ (2018), online: 
<https://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/>. 
25 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press, 2001). 
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II. Reacting without or within the system? 
The recent history of resistance against the financialisation of the food system is characterised by 
a series of attempts to expand the objectives of legal activism and directly targeted financial actors rather 
than (or together with) the companies that receive funds from them. As discussed in Section II.a below, 
some actors have tried to leverage public law and the existence of top-down legal constraints and sanctions. 
Among the tools that belong to this category, there are regulatory changes, new interpretations of the legal 
framework and the strategic use of litigation to obtain new judicial implementation of the existing 
discipline. On the other hand, Section II.b focuses on interventions that are embedded in the vocabulary 
and vision of finance, like the adoption of investments standards as a comparative advantage, the 
recognition of the financial relevance of non-financial risk and the divestment from stranded assets. In this 
latter case, the financialisation of the food system is not necessarily ‘the enemy’ but a possible ally in the 
improvement of the global food chain. While the former category challenges the financial system from the 
outside, the latter gathers experiences that are fully embedded in the premises and mechanisms of the 
financialised economy and aims to twist it to its own assumptions. 
II.a Reacting from outside: bringing finance under public control 
Around the first decade of the 2000s, the value of Canadian farmland had been steadily increasing 
by 14.5 percent.26 In response, the national government of Saskatchewan proposed legislation forbidding 
the purchase of agricultural land by pension funds: independently from their nationality, financial actors 
should not have been allowed to access land and bring up the prices. 27 Around the same time, the Canadian 
Province of British Columbia was, reportedly, considering the introduction of extra taxation for those 
investors purchasing agricultural land for speculative and non-agricultural purposes.28 In both cases, a 
regulatory intervention justified by the need to protect the agricultural nature of land, would impact existing 
and future investment strategies and reveal the possibility for public actors to contribute to the allocation 
of the resources that are responsible for the production of food. In this context, an intervention of the 
legislator that is territorially framed and limited by the jurisdictional boundaries of the Province would have 
achieved the desired outcome: the sole objective was to regulate what happens under the authority of the 
government and prevent the subordination of land to the global interests of finance. 
                                                             
26 Ibid.  
27 Jacqueline Nelson, ‘Saskatchewan Stops Pension Funds from Buying Farmland as Prices Rise’ The Globe and Mail 
(13 April 2015).  
28 Mark Hume and Kathy Tomlison, ‘B.C. considers tax changes for farmland speculators’ The Globe and Mail (20 
November 2016).  
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Another example is represented by the legal measures adopted (or proposed) by local and national 
authorities in the attempt to reduce the negative consequences of speculation on food. On the wave of the 
2008-2010 food price peak, proposals were advanced in the USA, Switzerland and the EU to limit the 
possibility of trading in commodity derivatives and agricultural derivatives more specifically. In all these 
cases—which obtained different levels of support and success—members of the civil society, farmers 
associations, NGOs and some regulators united around the desire to stabilise the commodity market and 
introduce regulatory reforms that would ‘include strict, legally binding and ex ante ‘position limits’, i.e. 
clear measures that would restrict the number and/or the value of commodity derivatives contracts 
(‘positions’) held by financial player.’29  
Of the three experiences mentioned above, one of the most interesting was launched in Switzerland 
at the beginning of 2016. A referendum was held under the name ‘No speculation of foodstuffs’ with the 
intention of curbing dramatic price rises on foodstuffs by restricting financial institutions from speculating 
on food and agricultural commodities.30Although it was defeated with 60 percent of the vote, the initiative 
highlighted the connection between Switzerland and the global food chain, but also the possibility of 
directly involving citizens in the West in decision affecting the transnational actions of financiers and the 
lives of people all over the world. Despite the land-locked nature of the country that positions it far from 
most physical trading routes, Switzerland represents the world’s most important trading hub with as much 
as one-third of the global transit trade in vital commodities such as oil, metals and agricultural goods that 
is realised by Swiss companies,31 most of which engage in hedging, speculative trading and OTC 
investments.32 Instead of assuming a protective and introverted approach to finance, as in the case of land 
acquisitions, the Swiss referendum would have been an expansionist and extroverted attempt to leverage 
the economic and legal ‘weight’ that a jurisdiction plays in the global food chain.  
The EU offers another interesting example of the possibility for regulators to redefine the 
relationship between financial actors, derivatives and commodities such as food. Since the 3rd January 
2018, position limits on financial derivatives have become a reality in the EU. 33 According to the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive, national competent authorities are now required to establish and enforce 
a maximum amount of commodity derivatives that a person can hold at all times with the aim of preventing 
                                                             
29 SOMO, ‘Building a Coalition Against Food Speculation (2011), online: <https://www.somo.nl/building-a-coalition-
against-food-speculation/ >. 
30 Anand Chandrasekhar, ‘Game Over for Food Speculation Initiative’ Swissinfo (28 February 2016). 
31 STSA, Commodity Trading in Switzerland, (STSA, 2016), online: <https://stsa.swiss/knowledge/switzerland>. 
32 PWC, The Hand that Rocks the Cradle -Regulation and the Future of Commodities Trading in Switzerland (2015) 
online: <https://news.pwc.ch/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/commodity-trading-event_ge_25.11.2015.pdf>. 
33 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (MiFID II). 
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market abuse and market distorting positions. Above all, the aim of the Directive is to avoid the convergence 
between prices of derivatives and the spot prices for the underlying commodity,34 a conjuncture that was 
considered by some authors one of the main drivers of the 2008 peak in food prices.35 Of the nine 
commodities that are covered by the directive, three are food: London cocoa, Robusta coffee and white 
sugar.  
It is too early to assess the impact of the Directive on speculative practices that often prejudice 
small-scale farmers. In the future, it will be of particular interest to enter into the details of national 
implementation and assess the material impact that they have had on investors, farmers and all the other 
actors operating along the three chains. Despite the partiality of the Directive’s scope (derivatives are issued 
in connection with several more food commodities) and the fact that it does not ban speculation on food 
commodities (i.e. the purchase of derivatives independently from the interest in the underlying commodity), 
the EU Directive and the other interventions like the Swiss referendum have the merit of proposing strategic 
thinking about trading regulation as the link between the materiality of food shortages and the global nature 
of finance. If the peak in prices that negatively affected millions of people all over the world was the result 
of the speculative practices taking place in few stock exchanges under specific rules, these proposals may 
help delinking the food system from speculative interests.36  
A third external reaction against the financialisation of the food system may come—
unexpectedly—from competition law and the regulators’ interest in looking closely at the fact that few 
financial players hold relevant amounts of shares in undertakings that are competing for the same market. 
This situation, which is technically known as ‘horizontal ownership’,37 has been neglected in the scholarship 
and only recently has obtained some attention from academics and practitioners,38 probably due, in part, to 
the recent acquisition of Monsanto by Bayer. In that case, BlackRock and Vanguard, two of the largest 
financial actors in the world, were major shareholders in both companies and thus significantly increased 
                                                             
34BaFin, Position limits for commodity derivatives (2018), 
online:<https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/BoersenMaerkte/PositionslimitsWarenderivate/positionslimits_warenderi
vate_node_en.html>. 
35 Russi (n 1). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Einer Elhauge, ‘Horizontal Shareholding’ (2016) 109 Harvard Law Review 1267. 
38 Eric Posner, Fiona Scott Mortong and E. Glen Weyl, ‘A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of 
Institutional Investors’, Antitrust Law Journal (Forthcoming); Ioannis Lianos, ‘The Bayer Monsanto/Merger: a 
Critical Appraisal’ (2018), Report submitted to the German Parliament (Bundestag), 32  
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their power in the seeds and chemical sector after the deal was cleared.39 In order to take finance seriously,40 
it would be the task of national competition authorities (and of the European Commission in the case of the 
EU) to shift their attention from the concentration in the market to the concentration at the financial level 
and assess its implications in terms of competition, effectiveness and distortion of the economy.41 However, 
it seems that financial concentration and the common ownership across the food chain are far from being 
taken into consideration (or even considered at all). In the Bayer/Monsanto case, to give an example, the 
European Commission required Bayer to divest parts of its business and identified BASF as the purchaser. 
Although an analysis was proposed on the anti-competitive impact of this structural reconfiguration, the 
Commission completely overlooked the fact that BlackRock and Vanguard—leading shareholders in the 
two merging companies—are also leading shareholders of BASF.42  
As these examples reveal, there are multiple ways in which public authorities (regional, national 
and local) can limit the operations of financial actors and the financialisation of the food system. They can 
single out institutional investors when it comes to having access to land, impose new rules for publicly 
traded financial instruments and adopt an approach to competition law that is more attentive to the role of 
finance in defining the economy. In all these cases, territories and jurisdictions are connected by the 
financial ties of the global chain of food production, so that changes operating within them are not all the 
same when it comes to defining the content and procedure of the financialised food system. Legal 
bottlenecks, chokeholds, barriers and leverage points do exist or can be created—even when we talk about 
finance.43 The tendency is, however, to engage finance from within. 
 
                                                             
39 Reuters, Major Syngenta shareholders would back Monsanto bid around $50 bln (2015), online: 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/syngenta-ma-investors/major-syngenta-shareholders-would-back-monsanto-bid-
around-50-blnidusl5n0xz3v720150508>. 
40 iPES-Food, Letter to the European Commission on the Bayer-Monsanto merger (2017), online:< http://www.ipes-
food.org/images/CoreDocs/IPES-Food_Bayer-Monsanto-merger6.10.2017.pdf>. 
41 Jose Azar, Martin C Schmalz and Isabel Tecu, ‘Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership’ (2018) 73(4) 
Journal of Finance 1; Einer Elhauge, ‘The Increasing Evidence that Horizontal Shareholding is Distorting Our 
Economy’ (29 June, 2017), Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, online: 
<https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/29/the-increasing-evidence-that-horizontal-shareholding-is-distorting-
our-economy/>; Einer Elhauge, OECD, ‘Tackling Horizontal Shareholding: An Update and Extension to the Sherman 
Act and EU Competition Law-Note by Einer Elhauge (6 December 2017), online:< 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)95/en/pdf>; Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scotto Morton and E. Glen 
Weyl, ‘A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors’ (2017) Antitrust Law Journal 
(forthcoming). 
42 Jennifer Clapp and Ryan Isakson (n 2). 
43 Deborah Cowen (n 16); David Harvey (n 16); Tomaso Ferrando, ‘Land Rights at the Time of Global Production: 
Leveraging Multi-Spatiality and ‘Legal Chokeholds’’ (2017) 2(2) Business and Human Rights Journal 275. 
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II.b Reacting from within: the food chain through financial lenses  
Actions that challenge finance from within can be categorised according to the mechanism and the 
objectives. With regards to the former, we can identify two macro-groups: interventions that leverage the 
ethical and reputational component of financial investors and those that mobilise the environment and 
society as non-financial considerations that funds’ managers have the duty to consider when they act in the 
best interest of their funds’ members.44 Through the years and across different sectors, civil society, NGOs, 
regulators and investors themselves have been ideating and implementing strategies and interventions that 
can be located in a chart that has objectives and leverage points as its two axes. As discussed below, some 
cases were characterised by third parties’ decision to impact one specific investment, while in other 
circumstances they aimed to shift any investment realised by a particular financial actor. Independently 
from where the actions are located, they all have in common the intention to engage with finance from 
within to generate material improvements in the real economy. Four examples are presented below to 
provide some food for thought about the combination between objectives and leverage points and to 
contextualise the EU Directive that is discussed in section III: the Principles for Responsible Investments; 
two examples concerning concentrated animal factories operations (CAFOs); the use of debt relationships 
as a leverage for change; and divestment from unsustainable operations in the name of the fiduciary duty 
towards members. 
One of the oldest initiatives concerning international investors was the creation of the United 
Nations Principles for Responsible Investments (PRI), a network of (now) more than 2,000 financial actors 
which rotates around six voluntary recommendations elaborated by a group of financial experts. These 
recommendations express the importance of bringing environmental and social governance (ESG) 
considerations into existing approaches to investments in order to make them less risky and therefore more 
resilient.45 Members of the PRI report on these six recommendations and the way in which they are 
performing them. The PRI have been appreciated because of their systematisation and translation into ESG 
terminology regarding several circumstances that are faced by companies all over the world. However, they 
have been criticised for their open and non-binding nature, which is only partially counterbalanced by the 
fact that annual reporting is a condition to remain part of the scheme.46 
                                                             
44 Christine Berry, ‘Fiduciary Duty and Responsible Investment: An Overview’, in Karen Wendt(ed), Responsible 
Investment Banking (Springer, 2015). 
45 Rolf D Häßler and Till Hendrik Jung. ‘In Principle Good: The Principles for Responsible Investment’, in Karen 
Wendt (ed) Responsible Investment Banking (Springer, 2015). 
46 PRI, Reporting for Signatories (2018), online: https://www.unpri.org/signatories/reporting-for-signatories. 
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Concerning transnational food chains, the PRI network has contributed, among other things, to the 
education of the financial sector on the relevance of ESG and has produced specific guidelines and 
recommendations that aim at nudging investors to consider the way in which climate change, poor 
conditions of labour and the excessive use of water may generate negative returns. For example, PRI and 
the WWF recently published an Investor guide on water risks in the agricultural supply chain which 
recognises agriculture as the world’s largest user of water47 and presents it as a risk for investors that must 
be understood, mitigated and integrated into their financial analysis.48 Similarly, the network published an 
online resource entitled ‘Engage the Chain: An Investor Guide to Agricultural Supply Chain Risk’ that 
provides investors with information about the social and environmental impacts driving material business 
risks for eight key commodities: beef, corn, dairy, fibre-based packaging, palm oil, soybeans, sugarcane 
and wheat49 and launched a collaborative programme on deforestation that recognises the financial risk of 
cattle raising.50  
In terms of leverage points, the PRI clearly stresses that responsible investment is not a matter of 
ethics but of fiduciary duty.51 The adoption of the principles and of its ESG guidelines should thus be of 
interest to all financial actors, including those unconcerned by ethical or moral considerations, because it 
has to do with the good financial performance of the investments and the satisfaction of the managers’ 
mandate. ‘To ignore ESG factors is to ignore risks and opportunities that have a material effect on the 
returns delivered to clients and beneficiaries,’ it is stated on the PRI website. 52 This is an affirmation that 
clearly illustrates the priority of financial motivations behind the establishment of the principles. If financial 
                                                             
47 OECD, Water Risk Hotspots for Agriculture (OECD Publishing, 2017).  
48 PRI and WWF, Growing Water Risk Resilience: An Investor Guide on Agricultural Supply Chain (2018), online: 
<https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=4195>. 
49 Ceres, Engage the Chain, (2018), online < https://engagethechain.org/>. 
50 Principles for Responsible Investments, PRI and Ceres Open Collaborative Engagement on Deforestation to Global 
Investors (2017), online: < https://www.unpri.org/news-and-press/pri-and-ceres-open-collaborative-engagement-on-
deforestation-to-global-investors/350.article>. 
51 The notion of ‘fiduciary duty’ itself has been the object of controversies and legal challenges. The traditional vision, 
for example, considers that ‘[t]rustees have a legal duty to not only invest, but to actively seek the best possible 
financial return . . . even if it is contrary to the personal, moral, political or social views of the trustees or beneficiaries.’ 
This would mean that any ESG consideration would be taken into consideration only if financially superior to the non-
ESG option, despite the ethical and moral desire of beneficiaries. See, e.g., Principle for Responsible Investments, 
Fiduciary Duty (2015), online: <https://www.unpri.org/fiduciary-duty/fiduciary-duty-in-the-21st-
century/244.article>; Principle for Responsible Investments, Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century (2018), online: < 
https://www.unpri.org/fiduciary-duty/fiduciary-duty-in-the-21st-century/244.article>; ClientEarth, Shell Pension 
Fund Member Warns of Legal Action (2018), online: <https://www.clientearth.org/shell-pension-fund-member-
warns-of-legal-action/>; Sarah Barker, Mark Baker-Jones, Emilie Barton and Emma Fagan, ‘Climate Change and the 
Fiduciary Duties of Pension Fund Trustees- Lessons from the Australian Law (2016) 6(3) Journal of Sustainable 
Finance and Investment; Christine Berry and Charles Scanlan, ‘The Voice of the Beneficiary’, in James P Hawley et 
al. (Eds.), Handbook of institutional investment and fiduciary duty (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
52 Principle for Responsible Investments, What is Responsible Investment?, online: <https://www.unpri.org/pri/what-
is-responsible-investment>. 
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performance is the leverage, stable returns on investments is the objective reached through voluntary 
adoption; there is no requirement that investors rule out investments or divest from companies that do not 
reach a specific ESG threshold.  
Differently from the fourth example provided below, and because the focus of PRI is the financial 
opportunity represented by ESG-performing investments and of the flexibility in the implementation, the 
scheme supports engagement with the investee with the aim of improving their conduct rather than 
advocating divestment. Yet, the primacy of financial performance and the the voluntary nature of the 
scheme determine the need to make a business case for the adoption of ESGs53 and that little is done by 
investors and companies until the materiality of the ESG is proved and evident. For example, in Brazil 
several institutional investors, banks and insurers have signed up to the PRI and the Principles for 
Sustainable Insurance (PSI). Nevertheless, in 2015 the country still supported cattle ranching, agriculture, 
fishing, and food and beverage companies with a high ESG risk profile, perfectly illustrating this 
limitation.54  
A second example concerns factory farming. There, investors’ eagerness to capitalise on the 
ongoing increase of world meat consumption is integrated in two initiatives, the Farm Animal Investment 
Risk and Return (FAIRR) and the Business Benchmark on Farm Animal Welfare (BBFAW), which look 
at Concentrated Animal Factory Operations (CAFOs) from the perspective of risk and financial return. As 
evident from the presentation of BlackRock’s World Agricultural Fund discussed at the beginning of this 
paper,55 financiers are betting that while the world will continue consuming animal protein, this will consist 
of better proteins, and are therefore channelling their funds to companies that adopt this same vision. And 
even if meat was completely replaced by synthetic meat or other foodstuffs, this change would probably be 
supported by a massive flow of financial capital. Without entering into the details of these projects, both 
initiatives are of interest because they attempt to translate animal welfare into something more than matters 
of ethics, rights and compassion: animal welfare is translated into financial terms to redirect investment 
strategies.  
BBFAW is a benchmark that ranks how the world’s leading food companies are managing and 
reporting their farm animal welfare practices. By ranking companies, they aim to attract investors and 
                                                             
53 Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch & Alexander Bassen, ‘ESG and financial 
performance: aggregated evidence from more than 2000 empirical studies’ (2025) 5(4) Journal of Sustainable 
Finance & Investment 210. 
54Danielle Carreira, Aaron Re’em and Miriam Tarin, Trucost, Natural Capital Risk Exposure of the Financial Sector 
in Brazil (2015), online: <http://cebds.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/GIZ-Natural-Capital-Risk-Exposure.pdf>. 
55 BlackRock (n 2). 
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consumers to those performing best and to sanction those at the bottom by indirectly making access to 
capital more expensive, thereby triggering positive reactions. FAIRR is a project launched by a private 
equity manager that reinterprets animal protein production (livestock and fisheries) through 28 ESG criteria 
and the Coller FAIR Protein Producer Index. For FAIRR, animal protein production is a matter of 
reputation, human health, regulatory compliance, climate change, deforestation,56 local community support 
and, ultimately, longer-term returns.57 The bottom-line is that better production means higher returns and 
lower financial risk and that investors should put their money where the combination of these two elements 
is most effective.  
In FAIRR’s words: “[m]ore humane farming practices tend to be more productive too. For example 
using ‘controlled atmosphere killing’ as a method of slaughter for chickens is described as both more 
compassionate and more cost-effective. Similarly, pasture-based grazing for cows means less stress and 
therefore more lactation cycles over their lifetime.”58 In FAIRR’s approach to the food chain, livestock and 
fish are proteins with a financial value and a risk. The vocabulary and the investment strategies are not 
defined by ethical or moral considerations, although reputation is considered. In this vision, CAFOs are 
like ‘new coal’; stranded assets with no future value that should be abandoned by means of improvement 
or divestment.59 Meat consumption and slaughtering are not problematised per se, but rather seen as a 
reliable source of income because of the changing dietary patterns in emerging countries.  
                                                             
56 FAIRR is one of the promoters, along with six transnational food companies, of the Cerrado Manifesto, a pledge to 
work with local companies in Brazil to reduce the conversion of forest into soy production. The wording and aims of 
the Cerrado Manifesto trigger several considerations that can only be sketched here. The Manifesto is a chain-based 
approach to deforestation that also involves financial actors; it is a recognition of the link between meat production 
and deforestation, although through the medium of soy; it states that local companies are under pressure to convert 
land and therefore a ‘coalition of the willing’ should be established to steer local actors towards more sustainable 
practices; it affirms that the legal standards of the Brazilian Forest Code are insufficient to prevent deforestation and 
therefore the higher private standard suggested by the coalition should be implemented. Finance and companies on 
the ground are thus coordinating to change production patterns, a process that would be of interest both for competition 
lawyers and for academics interested in private regulation and private legal transplant. On private legal transplant, see 
Tomaso Ferrando, ‘Private Legal Transplant: Multinational Enterprises as Proxies of Legal Homogenization’ (2015) 
4(1) Transnational Legal Theory 20. The Cerrado Manifesto is available online. FAIRR, Cerrado Manifesto (2018), 
online: https://cerradostatement.fairr.org/. 
57 FAIRR, Considering Farm Animal Welfare in Investment Decision-Making-Case Studies and Guidance (2015), 
online: <http://www.fairr.org/wp-content/uploads/FAIRR-Case-Studies-and-Guidance-June-2015.pdf>. 
58 Ibid, 3. 
59 The 2015 FAIRR Report contains one reference to divestment, that of Boston Common Asset Management from a 
company that appeared in breach from the organic requirements despite advertising its milk as organic. See FAIRR, 
ibid, 11. 
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A third kind of engagement with finance and the food chain is characterised by WWF and 
Greenpeace’s separate campaigns against Banco Santander60 and HSBC.61 There, the two international 
NGOs decided to leverage debt as a means to stop ongoing deforestation and the killing of orangutans 
connected with palm-oil production. In those cases, the two NGOs mapped, identified and targeted specific 
loans that Santander Bank and HSBC had provided to palm-oil companies and leveraged the reputation of 
the two banks to prevent the renewal of the financial support. Rather than concerning the overall portfolio 
of the banks or suggesting that the banks engage with the two company, WWF and Greenpeace pushed for 
a visible financial sanction that—they intended—would make it more expensive for the company to obtain 
funds. Similarly, FIAN international recently denounced the human rights violations connected with the 
actions of an agribusiness companies operating on contested land in the Matopiba region of Brazil.62 Unlike 
other cases of anti-land grabbing resistance, the objective was not to identify the companies that were 
directly responsible for the enclosures, but to connect the operations on the ground with the global financial 
system and pressure the Swedish National Pension Scheme—which had invested in the operations—to 
divest.63 
Because companies raise funds through equity and debt, we could thus imagine potential actions 
targeting not only shareholders but also bonds’ subscribers and loans providers that are directly supporting 
companies that market genetically modified organisms (GMOs), use slave and child labour, are responsible 
for the appropriation of water and biodiversity, or contribute to non-communicable diseases because of the 
poor nutritional content of the food that is produced. Unlike a pure financial approach, the actions 
mentioned here were not constructed around the financial unsustainability of the investment and the 
viability of the divestment, but on the reputational implications of non-divesting and on the power of 
naming and shaming.  
                                                             
60 Richard George, Green Peace, ‘Result: Santander Stops Financing Forest Destroyer APRIL’, (26 February, 2015), 
online:<https://www.greenpeace.org.uk/result-santander-stops-financing-forest-destroyer-april-20150226/>. 
61 Anna Rahmawati,  Green Peace, ‘HSBC Promises to Cut Ties with Forest-Trashing Palm Oil Companies’, ( 21 
February, 2017), online: <http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/hsbc-promises-cut-ties-forest-trashing-palm-oil-companies-
20170221>. 
62 FIAN, Land Grabbing and Human Rights: the Role of EU Actors Abroad (2017), online: 
<http://www.fian.org/fileadmin/media/publications_2017/Announcements_Calls_Flyer/WEB_Eng.pdf>. 
 
63 In a 2011 study of five investment funds falling under the Swedish national pension fund, Hamilton and Eriksson 
present a set of influence factors that were used by civil society actors to convince the funds’ managers to take ESG 
into considerations and redefine their investment strategies. See, Ian Hamilton & Jessica Eriksson, ‘Influence 
strategies in shareholder engagement: a case study of all Swedish national pension funds’ (2011) 1(1) Journal of 
Sustainable Finance and Investment 44. For a similar research on the Dutch fund, see Frank AJ Wagemans, CSA 
(Kris) van Koppen & Arthur PJ Mol, ‘Engagement on ESG issues by Dutch pension funds: is it reaching its full 
potential?’ (2018) 8(4) Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment 301. 
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A fourth possible intervention is represented by the call for divestment, which can be both promoted 
on moral ground and/or on the basis of the legal consideration that investors have a fiduciary duty towards 
their members to move money away from risky or unsustainable operations that may affect the financial 
viability of the portfolios. In this latter case, activists, lawyers and civil society are not (only) exercising 
reputational pressure but have been working hard to build a financial case for divestment which is couched 
in the vocabulary and ‘Return on the Investment’ (ROI) perspective that financial actors are familiar with. 
At the core of these interventions is the transformation of ESG consideration into material financial risks 
and the capacity of the proponents to demonstrate that the fiduciary duty—and not the moral nature of the 
investor—requires certain sectors and companies to be ruled out as potential investments.  
One of the more interesting aspects of the ongoing campaign to divest from fossil fuel—that could 
be transplanted into a potential campaign concerning the transnational food system—has been the 
identification of specific investors as preferred targets of the campaigns. The hope is that an operation 
realised by visible and financially relevant players could trigger a domino effect of competitors, whether 
because they mimic their investment strategies, do not want to lose clients concerned with the environment 
or society, or because they are worried of being the ones ending up with the worthless assets in their 
portfolios. When the Norwegian Pension Fund (the largest in the world which invests in more than 9,000 
companies in 72 countries) proposed to drop any investment in fossil fuel in December 2018,64 it 
communicated to the rest of the financial sector that it doubted the safety and reliability of this specific 
sector and forced investors all over the world to take the financial risk associated with climate change 
seriously.65 As a proof of the complexity of the sector, the concentration of ownership that creates concern 
from the point of view of competition law, is often seen as a strong opportunity behind an effective 
divestment campaign.  
What is often dismissed, is that any of the four tactics described above have required NGOs, civil 
society and the broader public interest in divestment to financialise their own vision of the world and their 
strategies. Bound by the need to produce technical arguments that resonate with the expertise and 
vocabulary of the financial sector, they may have abandoned or limited the use of other forms of 
resistance.66 When ethics or morals are replaced (or rephrased) by accounting for sustainable finance, 
                                                             
64 Norges Bank Investment Management (n 24). 
65Adam Vaughan, ‘World’s Biggest Sovereign Wealth Fund Proposes Ditching Oil and Gas Holdings’ The Guardian 
(London, 16 Nov, 2017), online:< https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/16/oil-and-gas-shares-dip-as-
norways-central-bank-advises-oslo-to-divest>. 
66 Divestment and ESG are a very technical sector dominated by the vocabulary, taxonomy and perspective of finance. 
NGOs engaging in this area, e.g. the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) have been adapting their narrative and strengthening 
their financial expertise. Such process, which may facilitate the dialogue with financial actors and investors, may be 
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fiduciary duty, ESG and the ‘materiality of non-financial issues’,67 engagement embraces a very technical 
vocabulary and is forced to process, assess and organise financial data as investors do. This is what is 
happening with the EU Directive 95/2014 on sustainable finance and the ongoing operations of the EU 
High-Level Panel on Sustainable Finance concerning taxonomy and benchmarks. At their core, these two 
processes have the idea of promoting transparency, disclosure, financial accounting of non-financial issues 
and the identification of a common taxonomy that can reduce asymmetry of information. In order to make 
finance sustainable, it is often stated at the EU level, the cost of ESG accounting must be reduced by 
adopting a common language and by creating a common ESG level playing field where financiers can 
operate and allocate resources towards environmentally (and socially) sustainable projects. In the context 
of this paper, the EU Directive can be interpreted as a new space of interaction between financial capital, 
legislators and civil society. Thus, the next section engages with the main elements of the Directive as a 
possible (but inherently limited) leverage point in the struggle to address the main flaws of the transnational 
food regime. 
III) Sustainable finance and the EU Directive 95/2014 
In 2014, six years after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the EU issued Directive 95/201468 
with the aim to support and facilitate the provision of finance to investments taking into account ESG 
considerations.69  From a technical point of view, the Directive amends the accounting directive 
2013/34/EU70 to introduce new accounting requirements for ‘large undertakings which are public-interest 
entities exceeding on their balance sheet dates the criterion of the average number of 500 employees during 
the financial year’ (Article 1).71 This equally applies to companies that are national of a Member State 
                                                             
seen as a form of elitism of environmental and social engagement and may pose problems in terms of communicability 
with the broader public and subordination to the premises and paradigm of the financial sector. 
67 The concept of ‘materiality’ of non-financial risks is central to the construction of the EU Directive 95/2014 on 
disclosure of non-financial considerations. The underlying assumption is that non-financial aspects of a company’s 
activities (protection of the environment and respect of human rights, labour conditions, corruption, etc.), have or may 
have a financial—material—impact on the value of the shares or of the overall enterprise, thus affecting the 
performance of investors’ portfolios. This means—among that non-material issues, i.e. risks that are borne by 
communities and the planet without any impact on the company’s financial performance, may be invisible. 
68 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings 
and groups. 
69 European Commission, High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance: Financing a Sustainable Economy 
(European Commission, 2018).  
70 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial 
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 
2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC. 
71 Directive 95/2014, Article 1: ‘large undertakings which are public-interest entities and to those public-interest 
entities which are parent undertakings of a large group, in each case having an average number of employees in excess 
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(incorporated in the EU), those that operate in the EU and whose EU operations reach that quantitative 
threshold, and parent companies of corporate groups that satisfy the same requirements (Article 3).72  
According to the 2017 EU Commission’s implementation Guidelines, the Directive applies to 
approximately 6,000 large companies and groups across the EU, including listed companies, banks, 
insurance companies and other companies designated by national authorities as public-interest entities.73 In 
the global competition for foreign and national investments, the Directive starts from the assumption that 
‘[g]reater transparency is expected to make companies (1) more resilient and perform better, both in 
financial and non-financial terms. Over time this will lead to more robust growth and employment and 
increased trust among stakeholders, including investors and consumers. Transparent business management 
is also consistent with longer-term investment.’74 Environmental protection, social responsibility, treatment 
of employees, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery and the diversity on company boards 
(in terms of age, gender, educational and professional background) are the areas that should benefit of the 
work of this new ‘coalition of the unlikely.’75 
In contrast to the fully privatised approach of the PRI or the regulatory approach utilised in the case 
of large-scale land acquisitions, the rationale behind the Directive is that it is possible to improve global 
capitalism through the interaction of states, market and civils society. The regulatory power, in this case 
both European and national, identifies and implements new disclosure requirements; investors select where 
to invest according to the information on their material ESG impacts; civil society can name and shame 
companies that disclose that their practices have negative effects (or risk them) or that do not disclose 
material conditions that should have been disclosed. Viewing the Directive from the perspective of the 
labyrinth of the financialised and transnational food chain, there are three main reasons to suggest it may 
act as a helpful tool to limit or redress current environmental and social degradation.  
                                                             
of 500, in the case of a group on a consolidated basis. This should not prevent Member States from requiring disclosure 
of non-financial information from undertakings and groups other than undertakings which are subject to this 
Directive.’ 
72  Directive 95/2014, Article 3: ‘Public-interest entities which are parent undertakings of a large group exceeding on 
its balance sheet dates, on a consolidated basis, the criterion of the average number of 500 employees during the 
financial year shall include in the consolidated management report a consolidated non-financial statement containing 
information to the extent necessary for an understanding of the group's development, performance, position and impact 
of its activity, relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-
corruption and bribery matters.’ 
73 European Commission, Commission Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting (European Commission, 2017) 2. 
74 Ibid.  
75 David Monciardini, ‘The ‘Coalition of the Unlikely’ Driving the EU Regulatory Process of Non-Financial 
Reporting’ (2016) 36(1) Social and Environmental Accountability Journal 76.  
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Firstly, the Directive would apply to financial actors themselves. This is evident from the 2017 
Commission Guidelines, that identifies banking and insurance as two sectors whose members have to 
report.76 Secondly, Member States have the option to extend this duty to other actors: as recently highlighted 
in a report by CSR Europe and the Global Reporting Initiative, eight Member States have decided to 
introduce an explicit reference to pension funds in their transposition of the EU directive.77 Thirdly, 
financial investors themselves may have a number of employers and a financial turnover that passes the 
threshold for application of the Directive as required by Article 1(1). In the case of Norway, for example, 
the draft proposal for the national transposition of the Directive extends the duty to all companies with more 
than 500 employees and a net turnover of more than 40 million or a balance sheet total of over 20 million.  
In the absence of any exception for the Sovereign Wealth Fund, we could thus imagine that the largest 
shareholder in the world would have to submit a statement in line with the indications of the Directive.  
The second reason why the Directive should be explored as a possible ‘legal chokehold’ in the 
complexity of the financialised food system is qualitative. Although not specifically mentioned in the 
Directive, Articles 1 and 3 contain broad references to the duty of disclosing ‘as a minimum, environmental, 
social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters’ which suggests 
that companies may be required to account for and reveal the material and potential impact of: labour 
practices including child labour and forced labour; precarious work; wages; unsafe working conditions 
including building safety, protective equipment, workers' health, trafficking in human beings and other 
human rights matters; greenhouse gas emissions; other types of water and environmental pollution; 
deforestation and other biodiversity-related risks.78 The non-financial declaration would thus act as a map 
of the tensions and criticalities of the whole chain and a possible leverage for systemic interventions that 
go beyond punctual solutions. 
Thirdly, the Directive and the Guidelines suggest that disclosure should be systemic and take the 
transnational nature of production seriously. According to the texts, undertakings have to adopt a chain-
based approach to disclosure and present both positive and adverse material impacts of their operations.79 
                                                             
76 European Commission (n 71). 
77CSR Europe and GRI, (2017) Member State Implementation of Directive 2014/95/EU. A comprehensive overview 
of how Member States are implementing the EU Directive on Non-financial and Diversity Information, Policy and 
Reporting. The countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain. Iceland 
too, as a member of the EEA, has included pension funds in its transposition of the Directive. 
78 Article 1, Directive 95/2014. 
79 The Directive discusses the chains-based approach in Recitals 6 and 8. Recital 8 of the Directive also indicates that  
‘the severity of such impacts should be judged by their scale and gravity. The risks of adverse impact may stem from 
undertaking's own activity or may be linked to its operations, and where relevant and proportionate, its products, 
services and business relationships, including its supply and subcontracting chains’. The 2017 Guidelines on non-
 
21 
 
In the case of non-financial companies, the Guidelines clearly require that they assess the whole network 
of production and, whenever the information is relevant, proportionate and significative,80  disclose all the 
material risks (actual or potential) that exist across different levels of production.81 In the case of a financial 
institution like pension funds, chain-based approach and the disclosure requirement could be interpreted as 
an obligation to account for and reveal all the potential or present adverse material impacts of companies 
that receive equity or debt investments.82 This is clarified by the Guidelines, which states that ‘[a] bank may 
consider that its own water consumption in offices and branches is not a material issue to be included in its 
management report. In contrast, the bank may assess that the social and environmental impacts of projects 
that it funds and its role in supporting the real economy of a city, a region or a country are material 
information’.83 Although the Guidelines present a positive example, there is no reason why financial 
institutions should not equally communicate information concerning the excessive use of water, the impact 
on biodiversity, the land consumption, the risk for human rights, and several other material situations linked 
to one of their investments.  
If we transpose this example to large financial institutions we may conclude that the Directive—
depending on the way in which it has been transposed by Member States—may be interpreted not only as 
an opportunity for financial investors to learn about companies and define their investment strategies, but 
as a legal duty for pension funds, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies, etc. to publicly 
disclose information concerning all the potential and actual risks hidden behind their existing investments. 
Of course, a lot depends on national legislations and their substantive and procedural content. Not 
surprisingly, the United Kingdom as an epicentre of global finance has a very limited list of public interest 
entities (listed companies, credit institutions and insurance understandings).  
With the appropriate legal framework in place, in the future we could witness the Swedish and the 
Norwegian Pension Fund, the University Superannuation Scheme (UK), Alecta or the BT Group producing 
non-financial reports containing the significant material impacts of their investments. Then it would be up 
to accountants, Member State authorities and civil society organisations to check the declarations and 
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80 European Commission (n 71). 
81 Ibid, 5 ff. 
82 The Commission Guidelines use the case of a bank to explain what it means in relation to materiality and key 
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decide how they could be leveraged to sanction or prevent possible violations of the right to food, 
biodiversity, the environment (for example, deforestation), access and use of water (for example, the 
existence of a struggle with local communities for the resource),84 workers’ rights (for example accusations 
against the chocolate industry of benefitting from slave labour in its supply chain)85 and other similar 
circumstances. 
In addition, the Directive may have more ‘teeth’ than a traditional corporate social responsibility 
measure would have. Although the EU document is silent in terms of sanctions, all Member States beside 
Denmark, Estonia, The Netherlands and Spain have introduced non-compliance penalties. In the case of 
Italy, for example, the law that implements the Directive introduces sanctions as high as 150,000 Euros for 
the omission of relevant information, non-compliance, or failure to submit within the timeframe, to be paid 
by the physical person who is responsible for the declaration.86 It is possible to imagine, although hard to 
see happening in practice, that the publication of the next non-financial reports of the largest financial actors 
in Europe will be followed with attention by civil society organisations, academics and activist lawyers 
interested in assessing gaps and misreporting, and that this could trigger the intervention of the national 
competent authorities and add an extra incentive for a behavioural change. 
Of course, it is hard to see how institutional investors who own shares in 9,000 companies will be 
autonomously reporting any relevant material condition or potential risk. As a matter of fact, ‘capital… will 
not voluntarily adopt restrictions and it will not bind itself to a company in the name of stewardship or an 
ecological and just food system’.87 In addition, it would be naïve not to be aware of its limits. Throughout 
the Directive, the use of notions like ‘proportionate’, ‘relevant’ and ‘significant’, for example, leaves a great 
amount of discretion with the companies, in particular in those cases where there is little transparency about 
the suppliers and where the cost of obtaining the information would be particularly high. Similarly, not all 
the Member States have endorsed a mandatory approach to the content of the Directive, with countries like 
the United Kingdom (which is central to the global financial world) endorsing the principle of ‘comply or 
explain’ which provides companies with the possibility of not fulfilling the disclosure requirements yet 
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remaining in compliance by merely justifying the departure from the standard.88 Moreover, Article 1(1)(e) 
of the Directive introduces the safe harbour exception, according to which  
Member States may allow information relating to impending developments or matters in the course 
of negotiation to be omitted in exceptional cases where, in the duly justified opinion of the members 
of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies… the disclosure of such information 
would be seriously prejudicial to the commercial position of the undertaking, provided that such 
omission does not prevent a fair and balanced understanding of the undertaking's development, 
performance, position and impact of its activity.  
In the context of financial investors and the disclosure of information connected with their 
investment strategies, portfolio composition and financial performances, there is little doubt that this ‘safety 
exit’ could significantly reduce the Directive’s effectiveness. Yet, the intervention of the Member States, 
civil society, watchdogs and international organisations interested in the respect of social and environmental 
rights (both at the regional and United Nations’ level) may play an important role in strengthening the 
existing framework, addressing its limits and pushing for a quicker and more effective transition away from 
investments that generate returns through exploitation of people and the planet.  
IV) Conclusions: towards a sustainable financialised food system or a de-financialised food system? 
Financialisation is increasingly redefining the food sector and intensifying problems of 
homogenisation, deprivation and appropriation. Although the effects of an increased financial pressure on 
the food chain is often perceived by people and the planet, financial connections are often hidden behind 
complex legal and economic structures like special purpose vehicles (SPV)89 that shield the identities of the 
final beneficiaries and increases the distance between violations and accountability. If we adopt the idea of 
‘root causes’ coined by Susan Marks,90 finance as the underling driver of food insecurity, land 
dispossession, loss of biodiversity and jobs, etc., often operates behind the logos of corporations, fiscal 
havens, SPVs and intermediaries.  
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To give an example, the largest US teachers’ pension fund, TIAA-CREF, doubled the amount of 
land that it owned in Brazil between 2012 and 2015. However, it did not do it by direct purchase (forbidden 
in Brazil), but by funding Radar Corporation, a Brazil-based company that appeared as the sole and 
legitimate owner. Similarly, Brazilian law-firms were recently denounced for aiding the Canadian group 
Brookfield to invest the funds from its Global Agricultural Investment Fund in a way that eluded the limit 
on foreign ownership of land in Brazil: instead of buying equity or land, they bought convertible bonds (a 
financial instrument) issued by the Brazilian company Emauba and obtained in exchange the guarantee of 
the payment of the 98.78 percent of the liquid profit generated by the company and the possibility to convert 
the bonds into shares when the ban on foreign ownership would be lifted. Financial and legal instruments 
become the way to avoid legal constraints and cover the roots of the problem.91 
In the struggle to think about countermeasures and possible forms of intervention within the 
complex conundrum of financial investments, transparency certainly plays a central role. The ability to map 
financial ties is essential to open the possibility to leverage them, engage with legal and political arguments 
and obtain some transformations. Although we know that around 80 percent of the global equity market is 
held by financial institutions92 and that BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street now own around 
88 percent of all stock in S&P 500 corporations,93 we lack a clear understanding of the way in which 
financial capital is intervening all along the food chain and how it is horizontally and vertically integrated 
within it. As discussed in this article, initiatives have been launched both from within and without the 
financial sector in order to counter the increasing relevance of financial actors: public authorities have 
drafted ad hoc regulations on acquisition of land and derivative trading, networks have been established 
that promote voluntary principles for responsible investments and activists have used both naming and 
shaming and the fiduciary duties of trustees to push for engagement and divestment from unsustainable 
sectors.  
In this picture, some (relatively unexpected) support may be offered from the implementation of 
the EU Directive 95/2014 and the introduction by each Member State of rules on the disclosure of non-
financial (and diversity information) in annual reports from 2018 onwards. Officially, transparency and 
publicity would be used by investors to improve their portfolios and choose investments that have a better 
ESG profile and therefore a higher probability of generating long-term return. However, Member States 
can also decide that these requirements apply to investors and can provide sanctions in case of mis-
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compliance. In some cases, they already do.94 Instead of helping investors to define their investment 
strategies, external stakeholders such as NGOs, civil society and legal activists could thus use the data 
disclosed by financial investors to scrutinise and challenge the role that their investments have in 
consolidating an unsustainable transnational food chain. However, this would require the institutional 
recognition of these actors’ role in engaging with finance, the provision of a straightforward system that 
facilitate their role as watchdogs, and the “recognition of a strong hierarchical logic between all the elements 
commonly identified as pertaining to sustainable development,” 95 with democratic, open and effective 
governance at the centre rather than financial performances. 
Yet, too much optimism would be misplaced for several reasons. To start with, corporate 
governance scholars have long pointed to the limits and flaws of engaging with institutional investors to 
transform them into stewards of the good functioning of global capitalism.96 Similarly, the unilateral 
decision to engage (or withhold funds) with companies that operate in violation of legal or normative 
standards may reduce the unsustainability of the food chain but may also produce unexpected negative 
effects along the chain outside the control and interest of the investor.97 For example, when a loan is not 
renewed or shares are sold, jobs on the ground can be lost, the national Gross Domestic Product may not 
grow at the same pace, a less sustainable investor may replace the previous one. In addition, the need to 
generate revenues is such that resources taken away from specific projects may be reinvested in equally 
problematic sectors (maybe less visible or away from public pressure). Equally, the decision to engage with 
a company instead of divesting may lead to the investors’ capture and consequently being locked into 
situations where it is too costly for the company to improve its performances and the needed ESG 
investments are not realised because of the impact they may have on the expected return.  
In the context of ESG, the decision to engage with finance and leverage its vocabulary and tools 
(accounting, ESG, materiality, reporting, etc.) generates an epistemological short circuit that cannot be 
simply solved by unilaterally implementing higher standards with the hope that they trickle down 
throughout the whole food chain or by preventing one project from happening. Moreover, and needless to 
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say, any measure undertaken within the paradigm of sustainable finance would be incapable of getting rid 
of finance itself. Thus, the tension and clashes between the industrial and global ideal world of BlackRock 
and the local and non-commodified framework of La Via Campesina (the largest peasants’ organisation of 
the world) would thus not disappear. On the contrary, movements and organisations may end up 
legitimising the ‘financial way of looking at the food system’ and accept that nature, people, biodiversity, 
labour conditions, etc. have a price tag and can be expressed in terms of ROI. For those who believe in the 
incompatibility between the vision of the food system as an opportunity for rent-seeking and the food 
system as a complex construction of socio-ecological relationships that is essential both for people and 
nature, their concerns will not be addressed.  
This should not come as a surprise but requires critical actors (including academics) to question 
whether the improvement of environmental and social performances of invested corporations justifies the 
rehabilitation of the financial system that was at the centre of the global meltdown of 2008 and the 
speculation on food commodities that skyrocketed the price of food all over the world. Is it truly possible 
to consider financial capital and financial actors as potential allies in the transition away from the global 
and unsustainable food system that they have contributed to and that they made their fortune from? Shall 
civil society, academics and activists put energy and time trying to nudge financial actors who currently 
“do not understand nor reward sustainable behaviour either because the markets are inefficient and do not 
reward good behaviour, or because market failure means that they do not need to worry about the very-
long-term costs as they are outside of their investment time horizons?”98 Is it worth translating the socio-
environmental issues that characterised the food system in terms of externalities and accounting procedures, 
if this means financing improvements but also justifying the extraction of financial rent from it? The 
tensions are evident, and everyone interested in engaging with the EU Directive and the EU framework on 
sustainable finance should be aware of them and of the systemic implications of their decisions.  
If we were optimistic, a solution may lie in between the complete rejection of sustainable finance 
and its full endorsement. Although hard to carve out, a new window of opportunity may have been opened 
by the mandatory nature of the disclosure introduced with the 2014 EU Directive, the application of the 
requirements to financial actors like pension funds and banks, the strengthening of the ‘financial watchdog’ 
role of civil society and the implementation by each Member State of robust and accessible mechanisms of 
monitoring and sanctioning. If actors were to combine these elements in a systemic strategy, they would 
leverage the transparency and visibility of the transnational financialised food system not to improve 
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financial performances but to give visibility to the nexus of causality between financial capital and 
unsustainable food chains. Instead of legitimising finance and its vision of the world, a stronger 
understanding of the financial complexity of the food system would expose the role of finance and 
financialisation in defining the food system beyond commodity speculation. Furthermore, it may help 
mapping actors and responsibilities, so that concrete legal, political and campaigning interventions could 
be devised. The idea that ESG accounting and disclosure will automatically improve the global economy 
while making finance actors more resilient is imperfect and must be rethought and improved. Yet, if 
properly understood and leveraged, it opens new spaces for the political, legal, financial and cultural 
challenges of rent-seeking capitalism and the planned misery that permeates transnational food chains.99 
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